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On Non-binary Personal Preferences in Society, Economic Theory and Racial 
Discrimination 
1. Introduction 
The Kanger-Sen formulation of rational choice theory, as in Sen (1991, 1997), is a 
non-binary relational logic based choice theory, of which the standard binary relational logic 
based choice theory, as in Debreu (1959), is a special case. And, this ‘binary rational choice 
theory’ is the foundation of the Arrow-Debreu model of ‘binary economic theory’, as in 
Debreu (1959).
1 If for each distinct person in society, the personal preference relations in 
Debreu (1959), which are binary in character, were to be replaced by non-binary personal 
preference relations, as in Sen (1991, 1997), then the resultant society is what I call a Non-
binary Personal Preferences based Society, and the economic theory of such a society I shall 
call  Non-binary  Economic  Theory.  Non-binary  economic  theory  is  thus  the  theory  of  a 
society  that  has  a  finite  number  of  persons,  each  with  a  distinct  non-binary  personal 
preference relation, and every person acts as a maximizer of his or her preference, as in Sen 
(1991, 1997).  
In this  paper, I  first  describe  some  of the  essential  features  of such a  non-binary 
economic theory and contrast it with the characteristics of the existing (binary) economic 
theory. Second, I deduce some implications of the non-binary economic theory for what parts 
of existing economic theory survive the intrusion of such non-binariness, and what parts do 
not. Third, I provide a substantive application of non-binary economic theory in the form of 
an explanation of a specific socio-economic phenomenon, that of racial discrimination, that 
has so far defied formal explanation. In my concluding remarks, I comment on the essential 
                                                            
1 Arrow’s original paper in general equilibrium theory appeared in 1951, but it was formalized at a much greater 
level of generalization in his joint work with Debreu (1954), and its pristine form appeared in Debreu (1951). 
Certainly, there are many extensions of this economic theory, for example to include asymmetric information on 
the  part  of  different  persons,  as  in  Akerlof  (1970),  just  it  has  a  great  many  applications,  for  example  to 
international trade theory, as in Jones (1971). 2 
 
role  of  non-binary  economic  theory  in  shedding  light  on  significant  aspects  of  health 
economics.  
The Kanger-Sen theory is a theory of maximization as a volitional act of choice by a 
person in the particular sense that such an action is based on a non-binary relation of (weak) 
personal preference that is defined on a (finite) set of alternatives.
2 Non-binary economic 
theory is a theory of a society that has a finite number of such persons. 
As I explain below, a distinguishing feature of existing economic theory is that the 
formal framework of analysis disallows any role to be played by distinctive identities of 
different persons in society, except in a very narrow sense. However, if the social issue under 
investigation  involves  an  operational  role  assigned  to  interpersonal  differences  in  the 
identities of distinct persons in a broader sense, in their respective personal acts of volitional 
choice, as for example in decision making that relates to hiring in labor markets or lending in 
credit markets, taking into account the racial characteristics of the employer or the employee 
or the borrower or the lender, then this necessarily involves departures from the standard 
reliance  on  binary  relations  of  personal  preference  defined  on  the  set  of  culmination 
outcomes in choice theory, and inter alia belongs to the domain of the non-binary economic 
theory, not to the field of existing binary economic theory. To see this, consider the following 
argument. 
If the decision making process of each and every person in a finite society is based on 
distinct,  respective  binary  relations  of  weak  preference,  Ri    defined  on  a  finite  set  S  of 
alternative social states, then the only basis of interpersonal differences can be the order of 
placement of the elements of S by distinct persons. No other basis of interpersonal difference 
                                                            
2 Of course, the Kanger-Sen theory is only one form that non-binary rational choice theory can take, because the 
negation of a binary relational logic based rational choice theory can take many different forms, and thus does 
not imply a unique non-binary relational logic based theory of rational choice. Another example of a non-binary 
relational logic based rational choice theory is a theory of binary meta-ranking of a class of binary rankings of a 
set of alternatives. 3 
 
is admissible under the requirement of binariness of the personal preference relation. For, if 
any tertiary considerations were to play a role, then, by definition, the personal preference 
relations would cease to be binary in nature, because something external to the mere pair-
wise  comparison  of  two  objects  would  also  play  a  material  role  in  the  expression  of 
preference. 
One  implication  of  this  argument  is  that  the  identity  of  a  person  in  society, 
irrespective of whether it is by self perception or by social recognition, as being White, or 
Hispanic, or African American, or the gender of a person, as being male or female, or any 
status in society the person may or may not have, can simply play no role in the expression of 
individuality of the persons in formal models, otherwise the pure pair-wise comparisonal 
property of elements of S embodied in the binary relation would be violated. Nor can the 
characteristic features of the elements of the set S of alternatives be allowed to play any role 
in a theory of choice that is binary, because only the interpersonal differences in the order-of-
placement of the elements of the set is rendered material by the binariness of their respective 
ranking relations, whereas any tertiary considerations that go beyond interpersonal order-of-
placement differences are rendered irrelevant. 
Impersonality is, however, by itself, the feature of binariness that lies at the heart of 
the deficiency of the formal methodological approach to choice theory as the foundation of 
economic theory, if the purpose is to explain identity-based disparate-interpersonal-treatment 
that is actually observed in reality, as noted by Arrow (1998) in an informal discussion of 
racial discrimination. And, his diagnosis – entirely correct – is that racial discrimination, 
which is impossible to ignore in reality, is also impossible to explain on the basis of existing 
economic theory, precisely because of its impersonal nature, when, in fact, the kind of formal 
explanation  needed  is  such  that  it  must  exhibit  an  identity-based  disparate-interpersonal-
treatment phenomenon. But, this can be remedied, as I argue below, and a formal model of 4 
 
racial  discrimination  or  gender  discrimination  can,  in  fact,  be  formulated;  however,  that 
requires  departure  from  the  binary  nature  of  the  personal  preference  relations  of  the 
individuals in society, so that tertiary considerations can be formally accommodated in the 
theory.
3 
2. Some Conceptual Issues 
If the identity of the actor engaged in the act of choice is of material consequence, or 
if the identity of an influencer – whether it be another person or social norms or perceived 
morality – is of direct, constitutive value to the act of choice, then a person is different from 
another person by a  characteristic that  is  exogenous  to the  element-ranking  feature  of Ri 
defined on S. This implies that non-binariness must be embraced as the appropriate way to 
model  the  characteristics  of  the  preferences  of  human  beings  who  are  engaged  in  their 
respective acts of choice, to get a grip on social, economic and political behavior in any 
society  that  has  individuals  who  have  distinctive  characteristics  that  are  material  to  the 
phenomena under investigation, such issues as gender and race. The formal framework that is 
suitable for the analysis of such issues is one in which the identity of the chooser matters, in 
the sense of Sen (1997). 
To see the departure in a more formal approach, consider a model of a society whose 
members have non-binary personal preference relations   
 for each person i = 1, … , n, 
defined on the set S and V is a background set on which Ri depends. In this case, ∀ ,  ∈
 :   
  , means that person i finds x to be at least as good as y, where both x and y are from 
the  set  S  of  alternatives,  when  conditions  V  prevail.  Of  course,  in  the  special  case  that 
                                                            
3 Moreover, the elements of S could be the culmination outcomes of personal actions, as is standardly the case in 
choice based on preference in economic theory in general, or they could be culmination outcomes cum processes 
that lead to the outcomes, but in the latter case the casualty would be that the property of strong monotonicity 
(or of local non-satiation) would not be defined. More on this presently, in the context of health economics. 5 
 
  = ∅,   is binary, because in this case the background set V is rendered irrelevant to the 
choice exercise.
4 Further, define 
    ,  
   =     |  ∈   & ~[∃  ∈  :    
   ] ,   
where  ∀ ,  ∈  :    
    ↔ [   
   & ~    
   ],  and    
   refers  to  strict  preference.  Here 
   ,  
   is the maximal set of un-dominated elements of S, where   
  is a binary relation of 
weak  preference  that  is  a  quasi-ordering  (reflexive  and  transitive,  though  not  necessarily 
complete), and V is a background set on which    is dependent. In general,    ,  
    ≠
   ,  
   , if     ≠   , so that a variation in the background set on which the binary relation is 
dependent induces a change in the implied maximal set itself. It is precisely the variation in 
the  background  set  on  which  the  personal  binary  relation  is  dependent  that,  in  general, 
implies a variation in the personal maximal sets that are predicated on the underlying non-
binary relation   
 . In some instances, the background set could simply be a person, the 
influencer, who may or may not be the mazimizer. 
3. Menu Dependence, Revealed Preference and Personal Utility Functions  
The background set on which the binary relations of weak personal  preference is 
dependent  can  manifest  itself  in  the  form  of  distinct  menus  being  available  to  the  same 
person,  and  thereby  influence  the  choice  as  the  person’s  volitional  act  of  maximization.  
Since in general, 
                                                            
4 In addition to    defined on S being binary (Axiom B), in standard choice theory it is assumed that it is (i) 
Reflexive, (ii) Complete and (iii) Transitive, so that it Completely Orders S (Axiom C). An additional restriction 
is placed on the set S so that any element   ∈   is a  finite-dimensional non-negative real vector that represents a 
combination of the quantities of distinct commodities (in physical units per unit time) that could be consumed 
by person i .(Axiom R). Two additional restrictions are imposed on this framework for it to be the binary 
relational choice theoretic model. First, Strong Monotonicity (Axiom M): ∀ ,  ∈  :   ≥    →       , where 
       ↔ [      &       ].  Second,  Convexity  (Axiom  V):  The  set        =   |  ∈   &     ,∀  ∈     is 
convex. It can also be assumed, if one wishes to give a real-valued numerical representation called a utility 
function to    defined on S, that the set       and the set   
     =   |  ∈   &     ,∀  ∈    are both closed, 
and this is called the Continuity Axiom, but this last requirement is necessary neither for the theory of personal 
binary preference maximization nor for the existence of general equilibrium in Debreu (1959). Axioms B, C, R, 
M, and V are sufficient for the existence of a Walrasian equilibrium of an exchange economy. Actually, Kelsey 
and Yalcin (2007) drop the completeness requirement and still obtain the general equilibrium existence result.   6 
 
      ,     ≠     ,    , if     ≠   ,  
where    ,    ⊆   can be interpreted as distinct menus from which person i contemplates 
making a choice, the dependence of the binary personal preference relation    on distinct 
menus renders the formal framework non-binary, since the sets of elements being ranked by 
this person are non-identical. For example, as Sen (1997) argues most forcefully, there is 
nothing irrational about     =     ,  ,     and simultaneously     =     , ,  ,    , and 
yet this type of menu dependence of a binary relation of preference violates the Weak Axiom 
of Revealed Preference, or WARP as it is commonly known. 
Menu dependence not only entails non-binary personal preferences, but a significant 
casualty  is  also  the  entire  Theory  of  Revealed  Preference,  including  the  role  played  by 
WARP. On further details relating to this matter, see Sen (1993). The implications appear 
even more serious in terms of damage suffered by economic theory if one recalls in how 
many theorems WARP has been invoked, if personal preferences in society are actually non-
binary. 
Moreover, regardless of whether non-binariness of personal preferences arises due to 
the operational significance of interpersonal differences in the identity of the distinct persons 
in  society,  or  whether  it  emerges  from  menu  dependence,  or  if  it  surfaces  because  the 
characteristics of the elements of the set being ranked by the person have features that are 
material to the ranking by this person rather than by another person, in all of these cases there 
appear quite forcefully some serious conceptual problems in the formal analysis of such a 
society  (with  non-binary  personal  preferences).  For  example,  what  is  a  personal  utility 
function if preferences are non-binary? It cannot be the one in Debreu (1959). Nor can it be 
the  one  in  Majumdar  and  Sen  (1976),  because  both  contributions  deal  with  binary 
preferences. Numerical representation of preferences is certainly a loss in replacing binary by 7 
 
non-binary  preferences.  But,  social  characteristics  and  group  features  can  still  be  given 
numerical representation. 
4. Theories of Value  
Production theory in economics remains intact, however, both in the Sraffa (1960) 
framework (that disallows the use of counterfactual information), and in the informationally 
distinct  (in  fact,  strictly  richer)  framework  of  the  production  side  of  the  Arrow-Debreu 
Walrasian, competitive general equilibrium model, as in Debreu (1959). The Arrow-Debreu 
model’s  usefulness  as  a  theory  of  value  does  suffer  damage  if  personal  preferences  are 
allowed  to  be  non-binary,  because  there  are  implied  problems  associated  with  the  non-
existence of a general equilibrium arising from non-existence of excess demand functions. 
In  spite  of  this  damaging  conclusion  for  the  non-existence  of  equilibrium  in  the 
Arrow-Debreu model if personal preferences are non-binary, it is important to remember that 
the  standard  model  was  never  meant  to  explain  social  or  political  phenomena,  but  was 
intended to provide an axiomatic basis of determination of prices in a market economy. In 
that important task, it does succeed. The problem arises when this model is used for other 
purposes  for  which  it  was  never  intended,  especially  for  analyzing  issues  that  involve 
considerations of menu variation for the same person or in dealing with matters of materially-
distinct identities of persons, among other influences that induce non-binariness of personal 
preferences in society. 
Srafffa’s (1960) theory of value remains unaffected by the inclusion of non-binariness 
of  preferences,  however,  because,  as  it  is,  preferences  play  no  role  in  his  theory  of  the 
determination of relative commodity prices or of the distribution of income between workers 
and  non-workers.  Thus,  numerical  measurability  (usually  ratio-scale)  continues  to  be 
applicable for the description of price determination and income-distribution determination – 8 
 
as in the form of revelation or in the manner of formation – in the markets for different 
commodities that are produced by labor and commodities, but this is true only of Sraffa’s 
theory of value, not of the Arrow-Debreu theory of value. This is a serious indictment of the 
Arrow-Debreu general equilibrium model because with non-binary personal preferences this 
model ceases to provide a basis of a theory of value. 
5. Expected Utility Theory and Game Theory 
It would be useful to identify the domains of decision making over which persons 
would (a) wish to deliberately engage exclusively in making pair-wise comparisons and (b) 
declare  an  alternative  to  be  at  least  as  good  in  every  such  pair-wise  comparison.  These 
behavioral assumptions characterize both the expected utility hypothesis of the descriptive 
type, and also are attributes of the basis of choice by every player in game theory. In light of 
the domains over which players engage in non-binary acts of choice, explanations of this 
latter form of behavior would necessarily lie outside the scope of present-day game theory. 
The  theory  of  games  or  the  theory  of  game-forms  with  players  with  non-binary 
preferences has not been written yet. For example, if constitutive role  is assigned to the 
identities of the persons in a prisoners’ dilemma as identifiable members of a society with 
social  norms  (for  example  those  who  snitch  on  others  get  killed  in  prison),  and  such 
information is also common knowledge, then the augmented-Nash outcome of the game need 
no longer be Pareto sub-optimal at all. Here again, some feature external to the binary choice 
process is taken into account by each player, thereby rendering the personal preference basis 
non-binary. 
6. Constitutive Value of the Identity of the Chooser in a Person’s Act of Choice 
It is futile, then, to seek an explanation for racial discrimination or of gender, age or 
tribal  discrimination  or  any  other  identity-based  disparate-social-treatment  theory  from  a 
binary-relation-based personal preference structure of a society. In fact, seeking to answer the 9 
 
question, “What does  economics  have to say about racial discrimination?” Arrow (1998) 
argues most forcefully, and concludes, 
Enough has been said to suggest that market-based theories give an inadequate account of the effects 
of racial discrimination on economic magnitudes and the effects of the economic system on racial 
discrimination. It is increasingly recognized that many social interactions with economic implications 
are  not  mediated  through  a  depersonalized  market,  but  rather  through  the  cumulative  effect  of 
individual choices. … The main point is that personal interactions occur throughout this process, and 
therefore there is plenty of room for discriminatory beliefs and preferences to play a role which would 
be much less likely in a market subject to competitive pressures. The network model seems most 
appropriate for the labor market, and perhaps less so for the housing, automobile, and credit markets. 
But in all of these, each transaction is a social event. The transactors bring to it a whole set of social 
attitudes which would be irrelevant in the market model. Models of racial discrimination in which all 
racial attitudes are expressed through the market will get at only part of the story. At each stage, direct 
social transactions unmediated by a market play a role. Even the market manifestations will be altered 
by these direct social influences. (pp. 94-98).
5,
6 
It is important to note that Arrow (1998), in his analysis of discrimination, supposes 
‘rational choice theory’ to mean that individual actors act rationally by maximizing according 
to a complete ordering, 
within the constraints imposed by preferences, technology, and beliefs, and by the institutions which 
determine how individual actions interact to determine outcomes. Further, the beliefs are themselves 
formed by some kind of rational process. By economic theory, we mean that in some sense, markets 
are  the  central  institution  in  which  individual  actions  interact  and  that  other  institutions  are  of 
negligible importance. (p. 94). 
                                                            
5 Emphases added. 
6 Arrow’s (1998) penetrating justifications of his claims are enlightening. He states, “The theoretical picture of a 
market is one of impersonal exchange. … There is no particular relation between a supplier and a demander; 
that is, a supplier is indifferent about supplying one demander or another, and vice versa. This is not a bad 
description of highly organized exchanges, such as securities and futures markets, but hardly complete for even 
most commodity markets, let alone the labor and credit markets. Suppliers and demanders have direct personal 
relations … Certainly, employment of labor involves direct personal relations between employee and employer 
(or the latter's agents) as well as among employees. Similarly, credit relations other than those represented by 
marketable  securities  have  typically  required  direct  personal  interaction  between  debtor  and  financial 
institution.  …  Most  analysts,  following  Becker  (1957),  add  to  the  usual  list  of  commodities  some  special 
disutility which Whites attach to contact with blacks, taste-based discrimination. … The trouble with these 
explanations is that they contradict in a direct way the usual view of employers as simple profit-maximizers. … 
There are at least two objections to this line of analysis. One is that introducing new variables easily risks 
turning the "explanation" into a tautology. … Perhaps more serious is the neglect of Darwinian principles. 
Presumably  the  population  of  employers  is  not  uniform  in its discriminatory tastes.  Then, under the  usual 
assumption of constant (or increasing) returns to scale, competition would imply the elimination of all but the 
least discriminatory employers. If there are any non-discriminatory employers, they would drive out the others. 
A further objection to the hypothesis that racial wage differentials arise from employer discrimination is that 
large corporations hire a major fraction of the labor force. Attributing taste to impersonal entities is a hypothesis 
of dubious usefulness. It is hardly in the stockholders' interests to discriminate under the postulated condition, 
and competition in the capital market should be effective in eliminating discrimination. Finally, the hypothesis 
of employer discrimination does not at all explain segregation by occupation. An alternative hypothesis is that 
labor market discrimination is due to discriminatory tastes of other employees. In the case of large corporations, 
for example, it would be those of the executives, although other scenarios have been advanced. But then it is 
easy to see that in simple cases, the natural equilibrium would be segregation within an industry-that is, firms 
with either all black or all White labor forces.” (pp. 94-96, emphases added). 10 
 
In  spite  of  tremendous  flexibility  in  the  formation  of  beliefs,  once  formed,  in  Arrow’s 
conception personal preferences in society are still represented by binary relations. 
7. Non-binary Basis of Explanation of Identity-based Discrimination 
In additional to Arrow’s (1998) critique of the approach to taste-based explanation of 
discrimination in Becker (1957, 1971), there is also the problem that Becker’s argument is 
identity-based, but has been conducted in a framework that is unsuitable for the investigation, 
since  it  assumes  that  personal  preferences  that  characterize  all  members  of  society  are 
entirely binary, thereby banishing from the framework any marks of individual identification 
such as gender or race. To see this, recall that, as noted in Section 2, in general,    ,  
    ≠
   ,  
   , if     ≠   , so that a variation in the background set on which the binary relation is 
dependent induces a change in the implied maximal set itself. 
If      represents a White employer and    represents an African American employer, 
then a theory of racial discrimination immediately follows, insofar as the maximal sets in the 
hiring decision out of the same set S of candidates need  not be  the same for the White 
employer as it would be for an African American employer. Moreover, contrasted with the 
inadequacy  of  standard  binary-choice-theory-based  explanations  that  Arrow  refers  to, 
incomplete segregation, both within an industry and across occupations, would emerge in the 
collective outcome, if non-binariness is embraced in the choice-theoretic formal framework. 
Thus the problem of complete segregation in the form of exhibiting only-black firms or only-
White  firms  in  an  industry,  which  is  necessarily  implied  by  binary  economic  theory,  is 
resolved by reliance on non-binary economic theory.  
This would explain the stylized fact of a higher unemployment rate among African 
Americans than among Whites in the U.S.A. Of course, a similar argument can be developed 11 
 
for males versus females, to explain the earnings differential between males and females that 
has been observed in most of the world. 
8. Positive Constitutive Value of Comprehensive Outcomes 
The  set  S  of  alternative  social  states  can  itself  be  given  narrower  or  wider 
interpretations. Typically, culmination outcomes of an action are the elements of this set in 
binary economic theory. But, there is nothing in the very language of choice theory that 
prohibits its elements from being comprehensive outcomes that are inclusive of the process 
by  which  a  final  outcome  is  reached.  If  so  interpreted,  then  the  choice  act  of  a  person 
involves an act of (i) relative evaluation of alternative actions prior to the choice act, and (ii) 
included  in  that  evaluation  are  both  (a)  positive  constitutive  value  attached  to  the  final 
outcome of an action, as in a pure consequentialist evaluation, and (b) positive constitutive 
value attached to the means by which the final outcome arises. Sen (2000) explores such a 
blend of both consequentialism and instrumentalism in the context of practical reason, where 
rationality is construed very broadly as bringing reason to bear on the choice of one’s actions, 
and having the person take responsibility for the consequences of her actions, while taking 
into account the over-all circumstances surrounding a person’s act of making a choice. An 
example is that a person’s death is declared involuntary manslaughter if a car’s brakes fail 
versus it being declared premeditated murder if a person makes a plan and executes it by a 
hit-and-run car accident. 
It must be kept in mind, though, that if the set on with the preference relation is 
defined is construed more broadly to include comprehensive outcomes, inclusive of processes 
and  identities  of  the  individuals  involved  in  the  processes  that  lead  to  the  culmination 
outcomes, then the strong monotonicity property is not defined, and without this property 
being satisfied, neither excess demand functions nor a Walrasian general equilibrium will, in 
general,  exist.  Quite  clearly,  non-existence  of  general  equilibrium  poses  a  very  serious 12 
 
problem for such a model to serve the purpose of a theory of value. However, as already 
noted,  Sraffa’s  (1960)  theory  of  value  remains  entirely  unaffected  regardless  of  whether 
personal preferences are binary or non-binary. 
9. Concluding Remarks 
In  the  evaluation  of  alternatives  available  to  a  person  in  many  circumstances, 
operationally-significant departures from binary personal preferences of members of society 
arise  because  evaluations  are  predicated  on  considerations  external  to  purely  pair-wise 
ranking exercises inherently dictated by binary personal preferences. Consider the case of 
cardiac stents (x) for patients with the appropriate risk profile, or defibrillators (y), or cardiac 
coronary angiography as the basis of treatment determination (z), as possible alternatives 
from which a person and her doctor are considering the maximal element. This is hardly a 
case of choice based on binary preference for a person whose risk profile does not rule out 
any one of the three alternatives outright. Moreover, the decision is based on a considered 
interaction  between  two  persons,  patient  i  and  doctor  j,  so  that  the  formalization  of  the 
maximization problem  of person i would take  the form      , ,  ,   ,  , with the  clear 
understanding that the set {x, y, z} is not a collection of culmination outcomes, but rather of 
procedures  or  processes  that  are  the  objects  of  personal  choice.  This  class  of  problems 
belongs squarely to the domain of non-binary choice theory. A great many occasions arise in 
decision  making  in  health  economics  that  involve  such  intricacies,  and  to  jettison  such 
features of reality from formal analysis, including those related to speed of post-op recovery 
(and thus of freedom associated with post-op mobility), would be tantamount to taking on 
board inadequacies in formalization of the type Arrow (1998) has made reference to in his 
discussion  of  racial  discrimination,  though  for  reasons  distinct  from  the  one  of 
personalization to which he attributes the problem. 13 
 
There is much work that remains to be done here. Choices of such kind as arise in the 
example of health economics discussed above involve process-valuation at the constitutive 
level that goes beyond attaching value only to culmination outcomes far more than choice 
problems do in the case of deciding on the consumption of commodities such as bread, butter 
or haircuts, simply because issue of life and liberty are also involved in the former exercise in 
an operationally significant manner, and these are not matters that can be handled adequately 
by a binary framework of personal preferences.
7 
Concepts such as liberty of a type that is based on interpersonal differences over 
operationally-valued  domains  of  influence  would  also  fall  beyond  the  reach  of  binary 
relations. Sen (2002), in his revised Arrow Lectures, has formalized these issues of freedoms 
using non-binary relational logic, with special reference to the opportunity-aspect of personal 
freedom and the process-aspect of personal liberty, which is more dominant in the literature 
on rights. Also, some types of abridgment of individual liberty can be captured if a role is 
allowed to be played in formal models by a person who acts as a freedom restrictor (such as a 
prison guard) and influences the act of choice of another person (the prisoner). In such a 
manner, concepts such as power arising from interpersonal differences over operationally-
valued domains of influence can also be examined, but this would also require eschewing 
formal models based on binary personal preferences. 
I also wish to clarify that replacing binary personal preference relations by non-binary 
ones in the model of a society must not be construed to be a license to bring absolutely 
anything and everything, including aliens and extra-terrestrials, into the domain of discourse. 
There is no need to depart from the principle of maximization as a volitional act of personal 
choice, but there is benefit that comes from increasing the scope and reach of economic 
                                                            
7 It is thoroughly unclear what strong monotonicity would mean if the set on which the ranking relations is 
defined in decision making in health economics is not merely the set of commodity bundles but rather a set of 
treatment processes inclusive of the culmination outcomes. 14 
 
theory by enlarging the domain of considerations in formal analysis through the inclusion of 
those tertiary features that are particularly relevant to the social phenomena of interest, even 
if they are exogenous to the pair-wise comparisonal feature of a person’s choice. 
It  is  worth  emphasizing  that,  in  spite  of  the  non-existence  of  equilibrium  in  the 
Arrow-Debreu  model  if  personal  preferences  are  non-binary,  this  standard  model  was 
intended  to  provide  an  axiomatic  basis  of  determination  of  prices  in  a  market  economy, 
which it accomplishes admirably. Problems arise when this model is used for other purposes 
for which it was never intended, especially for analyzing issues that involve considerations of 
menu variation for the same person, when the source of variation for a personal maximal set 
is the identity of the chooser in a society, or the influence on personal choice is the set of 
norms of behavior in society.   
Materially-personalized interaction in social, economic and political spheres of human 
activity  is  wide-spread.  And,  as  the  argument  developed  in  this  paper  indicates,  such 
phenomena are not amenable to formalization in a choice theoretic framework that is binary 
in character. There is, thus, much to be gained by bridging the existing gap between such 
real-world phenomena and their theoretical explanations, by employing non-binary economic 
theory. Non-binary relational logic can, therefore, play a very useful role in explaining social, 
economic and political phenomena in formal models that are methodologically capable of 
utilizing  information  typically  processed  and  utilized  by  human  beings  in  their  routine 




Akerlof, George, A. (1970), “The market for "Lemons": quality uncertainty and the market 
mechanism,” The Quarterly Journal of Economics, Vol. 84, No. 3, 488-500.  
 
Arrow, Kenneth J. (1998), “What has economics to say about racial discrimination?” Journal 
of economic perspectives, Vol. 12, No. 2, 91-100. 
 
Becker,  Gary  S.  (1957,  1971),  Economics  of  discrimination,  Chicago  University  Press, 
Chicago. 
 
Debreu, Gerard (1959), Theory of value, Yale University Press, New Haven. 
Jones, R. W. (1971) “A three factor model in trade, theory and history,” in Trade, Balance of 
Payments and Growth: Essays in Honor of Charles P. Kindleherger, North Holland, 
Amsterdam, 3-21. 
 
Kelsey, David & Yalcin, Erkan, 2007. "The arbitrage pricing theorem with incomplete 
preferences," Mathematical Social Sciences, Elsevier, Vol. 54, No. 1, 90-105. 
 
Sen, Amartya (1991), “Non-binary choice and preference,” in Prawitz, Dag, Skyrms, Brian, 
Westerstahl, Dag (1994), Logic, Methodology and Philosophy of Science IX, Proceedings of 
the  Ninth  International  Congress  on  Logic,  Methodology  and  Philosophy  of  Science, 
Uppsala, Sweden, August 7 – 14, 1991. 
  
__________ (1993), “Internal consistency of choice,” Vol. 61, Issue 3, Econometrica, 495-
521 (Presidential Address to the 1984 Econometric Society Congress). 
 
__________ (1997), “Maximization and the act of choice,” Vol. 65, Issue 4, Econometrica, 
745-779. 
 
__________  (2000), “Consequential evaluation and practical reason,” Journal of Philosophy, 
Vol. 97, No. 9, 477-502. 
 
__________ (2002), Rationality and freedom, Belknap Press of Harvard University Press, 
Cambridge, Massachusetts. 
 
__________  and  Majumdar,  Mukul  (1976),  “A  note  on  representing  partial  orderings,” 
Review of Economic Studies, Vol. 43, No. 3, 543-545. 
   
Sraffa,  Piero,  (1960),  Production  of  commodities  by  means  of  commodities,  Cambridge 
University Press, Cambridge.  
   